This paper proposes a simple index of the welfare significance of uncertainty in the public goods resulting as policy outcomes. Our measure is the ex ante compensation an individual would require to accept an uncertain level of service compared to receiving the expected value of the distribution of possible values for that service. Our compensation measure is a function of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the variance in the measure of environmental service associated with policy and relevant for the individual, and a set of conventional parameters that describe the properties of nonmarket benefit measures under conditions of certainty. We would expect that the inverse virtual price elasticity of the for the environmental service and the square of the coefficient of relative variation are the primary factors influencing the size of our compensation index.
Introduction
Most of the literature on policy design under uncertainty since Weitzman's [1974] classic paper considers how uncertainty about pollution control costs, that is assumed known to firms but unknown to policymakers, affects instrument choice. This approach to modeling the effects of uncertainty is incomplete. When there is uncertainty about how firms will respond to a policy we should expect the realized environmental quality will also be uncertain regardless of the instrument that is selected. None of the benefit analyses for evaluating a new policy take account of the fact that when the outcomes of that intervention are uncertain, the benefit measures attributed to the policy will be different from what are conventionally used in benefit cost analyses.
A recent example of the importance of uncertainty in policy outcomes can be found in Cropper et al.'s [2017] comparison of the estimates from EPA's Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) of the 1998 Cluster Rule, designed to reduce hazardous air and water pollutants from pulp and paper mills, with what was realized. They note that the RIA's predicted reductions in chloroform were largely achieved, but other toxic air pollutants experienced reductions that were half of what was predicted and there was no reduction in PM10 1 . More generally, when analysts consider the outcomes of policy using monitored levels of air pollution they find significant variability in what is realized. For example, Brajer et al. [2010] note that between 2005 and 2007 in Southern California the eight hour ozone standard was exceeded about one third of the time somewhere in the region, despite an aggressive program of regulation that was expected to assure the standard would be met. Fowlie and Muller [2017] have also documented how differences in what is known about abatement costs ex ante versus what is realized ex post can impact the welfare properties attributed to different policy instruments. Using Muller's [2011] AP2 model, along with engineering estimates of source specific and technology specific abatement costs, they compare differentiated tradeable emission permits with undifferentiated permits for EPA's NOx Budget Program (NBP) 2 . Their analysis assumes perfect compliance by the electric generating plants subject to the rule. Even with this ideal adherence to the regulation, they find the difference between plants' ex post observed compliance choices and the decisions that would minimize the ex ante compliance costs were sufficient to undermine any theoretical preference for differentiated emission trading policies. When regulators do not have knowledge of the intra-source distribution of marginal costs, policies based on ex ante engineering estimates of them can lead to markedly different outcomes than what is realized ex post. While the Fowlie and Muller analysis uses a simple description of the damage function for NOx, the AP2 model does incorporate estimation uncertainty for the key parameters leading to the model's marginal damage estimates. All of the benefit measures in these analyses assume people do not recognize the potential for uncertainty in the outcomes of policy 3 . This assumption is inconsistent with what has been learned from several studies of households' avoidance behavior. Graff Zivin and Neidell [2009] , for example, found the 2 AP2 is an integrated assessment model that connects emissions of five common air pollutants (nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, fine particulate matter, ammonia, and volatile organic compounds) to estimates of ambient concentrations, exposures to air pollutants, physical effects, and monetary damages. This last step is as a reduced form computation. See Baker et.al.[2018] for a comparison of the AP2 model to alternative reduced form models used to compute the physical effects and monetary damages from emissions of these air pollutants. 3 Chavas and Mullarkey [2002] provide the most comprehensive effort to unify the literature on ex ante welfare measures under uncertainty. Using a two period model that distinguishes both the timing of decisions and the resolution of uncertainty, these authors describe how the contributions of information, risk aversion, and policy can be distinguished in ex ante welfare measures. Their risk measure is a conditional measure of risk aversion. It is the premium that an individual would pay ex ante to have knowledge of the expected values for both periods' sources of uncertainty. In this context, choices could be made under conditions that reflect compensation for resolution of the first period's uncertainty, but with only the information a risk neutral decision maker would need for private choices. Policies are defined so that they focus on changes in services that are not subject to private choice. These services can influence the choices of private consumption goods and thus would affect the decomposition of the ex ante compensation into the conditional value of risk and the individual's valuation for the policy. They do not consider uncertainty in the policy outcomes as we treat it here. behavioral dynamics of responses to smog alerts depend on the pattern of alerts and can be interpreted as a response to the uncertain air quality conditions 4 .
We develop a simple index of the bias arising when the environmental quality improvement from policy is uncertain. Two cases are considered. The first assumes the baseline level of environmental quality is not random and that only the level of quality realized with a new policy is random. The second case treats both the baseline and level arising from policy as random.
Our analysis develops a second order approximation for a welfare measure that is interpreted differently depending on the description of the policy context. For the first case, where only the outcome of policy is uncertain, our measure is an approximation for the certainty equivalent. We can distinguish two parts of this measure. The first is the second order approximation for the Hicksian equivalent surplus for a certain (non-stochastic) increase in the environmental service associated with a policy. The second is a term reflecting the adjustment a consumer would require to this conventional measure due to the effects of uncertainty in the outcome of that policy. When there is uncertainty about both the baseline and the outcome from policy we define an option price. Our expression is a second order approximation that distinguishes the conventional surplus measure and includes the term reflecting the uncertainty which, in this case, depends on the magnitude of the variance in baseline compared to the variance in the post policy conditions. The general form of our index is not affected by the definition we adopt for the welfare measure -whether certainty equivalent or willingness to pay in the case of one random variable or the equivalent and compensating definitions for the option price when both baseline and policy outcomes are random variables. There is the conventional difference between equivalent and compensating definitions and the associated welfare measures for our cases as a result of income effects. This extension is important because it distinguishes risk aversion arising from uncertainty in the public good from risk aversion arising from income uncertainty. With non-separable preferences, the ability to adjust the consumption levels of private goods in response to different levels of the quasi-fixed environmental service affects how the two types of aversion are related. Our compensation measure describes how this connection, together with private adaptation, influences the importance of uncertainty in the amount of the environmental public good. In addition, the assumption of non-separable preferences allows measureable features of individual demand to be used to characterize individual attitudes toward uncertainty in the amount of the quasi-fixed, environmental good.
To offer a "back of the envelope" estimate of what our index would imply for the potential importance of uncertainty in what environmental policy is able to provide, we use the case of a certain baseline and an uncertain policy outcome. We begin with the Currie- Section two describes how the benefits from improvements in environmental quality are commonly estimated and provides a selective summary of the past treatment of uncertainty in these analyses. The third section derives our index of the importance of people's responses to uncertainty in environmental services. The last section sketches the details for our back-ofthe-envelope calculation. It also discusses some next steps for considering how the uncertainty in policy outcomes can be included in the benefits measures used in benefit cost analysis.
Context
When benefit cost analyses are prepared to evaluate environmental policies the constraints of time and resources usually require simplified estimation strategies.
Conventional economic theory would define the benefits in terms of an indirect utility function. That is, given a quasi-concave direct utility function, with q designating the amount of an environmental service available to an individual as a quasi-fixed commodity, then the compensation, A, an individual would require to forego an improvement in from 0 to 1 is defined in equation (1).
(1) ( 0 , , + ) = ( 1 , , ) ( , , ) designates the indirect utility function. Individual income is represented by m and a vector of prices for goods and services with p.
Often benefit cost analyses would approximate A using an estimate of the unit benefits, b, as in equation (1a) 5 . (
The connection between A and ̂ has been discussed extensively in the literature on benefits transfer, usually within a willingness to pay framework. One simple way to motivate a link between A and ̂ is to replaces the left side of equation (1) with a first order Taylor approximation in income around the point defined by ( 0 , , ). This relationship is given in equation (2).
(2)
Replacing the right side of (1) with a first order expansion in q around (m, p, 0 ) and substituting (2) for the left side of (1) yields (3) as an approximation for A. It also offers a specific interpretation of the measure that should be used for b from equation (1a). It should be the virtual price for q, ( ). ⁄ 6 5 Most of the benefit cost analyses prepared as part of evaluating new policies assume the changes under study are small in relationship to the overall economy. As a result general equilibrium (GE) effects are not considered. Smith and Zhao [2019] discuss an index for gauging when GE effects need to be considered. Our approach could be extended to this setting. However, the current state of the art in benefit estimation limits our ability to characterize both the nature of GE effects and the potential for uncertainty influencing GE outcomes. So we consider this issue one for future research when these information gaps improve.
(3) ̂=
• ( 1 − 0 )
When we assume that the effects of policy are uncertain, then the definition for either the compensation or willingness to pay for a policy needs to be reconsidered. An early recognition of these issues by Foster and Just [1989] considered a situation when consumers recognize that quality is uncertain and make commitments to purchase private goods and services based on their initial beliefs about quality 7 . To develop measures for the benefits from information policies, the authors consider a thought experiment. Our analysis describes how an index of the importance of uncertainty can be derived within a general setting that distinguishes the second order approximation for a certain change in environmental quality from the adjustment required to take account of uncertainty in the policy outcomes. This decomposition is derived for the two cases we consider -when the 7 Quality in their case is associated with a private good. Because it is assumed to make a separate contribution to individual preferences, their analysis is directly relevant to situations where environmental quality affects the value of private goods. For example the water quality of a lake would influence households' decisions to use the lake for their recreation. 8 Compensating surplus is then the difference in the expenditures required to realize the original utility level with the new and old information and associated prices adjusted by the difference in the expenditures required to purchase the original amount of the private good at the old and "new" price. This new price is what would be required for the individual to purchase the original consumption level of the private good with the new information.
policy outcome is treated as random and when both the baseline and the policy outcomes are random.
Risk Aversion and Compensation for Policy Uncertainty a. Uncertainty in Environmental Quality Outcomes of Policy
Our goal is to develop an index of the effects of uncertainty in a nonmarket environmental service while holding prices and income constant. The first case considers a situation where we assume the baseline level of environmental quality is not a random variable and the level of quality resulting from the policy is. We begin with the definition of a certainty equivalent measure, . This is the compensation an individual would require to be indifferent between a certain baseline level of environmental quality ( 0 ) with compared to a random level of quality that has a higher mean value of � 1 , as defined in equation (4) 9 .
(4) [ ( , , )] = ( 0 , , + )
To develop our index and connect the result to measures of individual risk aversion, we begin by defining the random environmental quality in equation (5).
The term is random with distribution function 1 ( ), expected value of ( � 1 − 0 ), and a variance of 2 . The term defines an index that allows the impact of the policy change leading to a random outcome for environmental quality that varies in magnitude. Our certainty equivalent measure, , will be a function of the parameters describing the distribution for . This use of this certainty equivalent, , is a bit different from the usual definition (see Gollier [2001] p.21, equation (2.3)). In the conventional case, we are usually considering uncertainty in wealth (or income) and defining the certainty equivalent in the same units. Here the uncertainty is in terms of a non-market service and the certainty equivalent is in terms of a market good, our numeraire. As a result, it is possible to describe how the degree of substitution between market and nonmarket goods, reflecting the ability to adapt, will influence measures for .
Taking a second order expansion of in terms of t, and expressing the derivatives of in terms of the derivatives of the indirect utility function, we can link our approximation to estimated parameters in the literature. Equation (6) replaces the left side of (4) with the definition, using 1 ( ) to describe the uncertain outcome of the policy intervention and its implications for the resulting .
Differentiating both sides of (6) with respect to and evaluating the expression at = 0, we have (6a) which confirms that ′ (0) uses the virtual price or shadow value for , with the partial derivatives of (. ) evaluated at � 0, , �, to approximate the benefits from the change in environmental quality associated with the mean level of with the policy, compared to the non-random baseline or ( � 1 − 0 ).
In what follows we will use to designate the virtual price of . In practice, an average estimate of consumer surplus per unit change in the measure of environmental quality is often used to provide an approximate measure of .
Taking a second derivative of equation (6) with respect to , using our assumptions about the properties of and evaluating the result at = 0, we have an expression for ′′ (0) as given in equation (7) 10 .
10 Differentiating equation (6) twice with respect to , we have: ∫ 2 1 ( ) = ′′ ( ) + ′( ). By evaluating the partial derivatives of ( , , ) at t=0 we assure consistency in the point of evaluation of the functions on each side of the equations defining our welfare
Now using (6a) and (7) in a second order expansion in terms of , with the derivatives evaluated at = 0, we develop an approximation that allows us to separate how our expression for the certainty equivalent includes both the conventional benefit measure (associated with a certain change in environmental quality from 0 � 1 ) and an adjustment that takes account of the uncertainty in the level of environmental quality that the policy intervention produces. As we noted earlier, our certainty equivalent is being defined for an environmental service, not a factor that is defined in monetary terms such as income or wealth and affects individual wellbeing. Our goal in developing this approximation for is to use the properties of an individual's preference function to provide links between measures of the importance of variation in environmental services and conventional measure of risk aversion.
Using equations (6a) and (7) in this second order approximation for ( ) given in (8), we have equation (8a):
We can use the properties of the virtual price function to provide an alternative expression for that is more directly linked to parameters that can be estimated. Equations (9a) and (9b) provide the link between the derivatives of and and the indirect utility function.
measures. Using the properties of , namely, ( 2 ) = 2 + ( � 1 − 0 ) 2 , we have the expression in equation (7). See the online appendix for the details of the derivation. (8a) to be written in a form that is more directly recognized as comparable to a Slutsky-like equation for an inverse demand function (see Anderson [1980] p.288, equation (18)).
The first two terms in (10) (6)). The last term is our index for the adjustment due to policy uncertainty.
We can re-write this last term by introducing 0 into the numerator and denominator. The term ( − 0 � ) is now recognized as the coefficient of relative risk aversion for , denoted by . It describes the curvature of the preference function in terms of the nonmarket environmental service 11 . Focusing on this third term, now labeled as c , (to distinguish it from the approximation for the certainty equivalent ), we have equation (11).
(11) ≈ − 1 2 2 0 11 The derivatives of ( , , ) are evaluated at 0 . This assumption is based on the assumption that the information for evaluating policies describes consumer behavior under the baseline conditions.
With some further substitutions, we can connect our index to concepts with available estimates from applications. Using (9a) and (9b) we can write the income elasticity of the virtual price of in (12)
Now we can express the relative risk aversion coefficient for , in terms of the income elasticity for , the relative risk aversion coefficient for risks to income , defined as = �− �, and the inverse "price" elasticity for as in equation (13). Weak complementarity and the Willig [1978] condition imply that is equal to the income elasticity of the weak complement (Palmquist [2005] ) 12 . As a result, for those cases where q has a private good that is a weak complement, equation (13) can be re-written using this income elasticity, , for a private good that is assumed to be a weak complement to as equation (14).
To our knowledge has not been estimated. Thus equation (14) allows our index of the effects of uncertainty in to be expressed in terms of measures of preferences that have been estimated in a variety of contexts. As we noted earlier, it is also important to acknowledge all measures of risk aversion depend on what is allowed to adjust. For the case of environmental quality this is especially important because we usually label these adjustments in expenditures on private goods and services or allocations of time as adaptation. One can readily demonstrate that bounds for the measures of aversion depend on the extent of adaptation. Measures of aversion are smallest when all private goods are allowed to adjust and can be expected to be progressively larger as adjustment options are restricted 13 . Substituting for using (14) into (11) we can express c relative to the virtual expenditures for q evaluated at the expected value as in equation (15).
Our derivation also provides a description of the relationship of our index to a second order approximation of the compensation measure for a certain change in and the first terms in equation (10) is the conventional measure of benefits used in practice.
b. Uncertainty in Environmental Quality Before and After Policy
To treat both the baseline and policy generated levels for q as random we must introduce a new measure of the welfare change for a policy. Instead of a certainty equivalent we use the equivalent surplus version for the option price (OP), as defined in equation (17).
(17) � ( � 0 + , , ) 1 ( ) = � ( � 0 + , , + ( )) 0 ( ) In this equation 0 ( ) is the distribution function for (the error added to the baseline, average environmental quality, � 0 ) to allow for uncertainty in the initial level of quality. Now we re-define ( ) = � 1 − � 0 . We assume E( ) = 0 and the variance in is 2 . Using the 13 Assume there are N private goods, described as = ( , ), with a single good and a vector of − 1 goods. Comparing the absolute magnitude of measures of an individual's aversion to variation in , we can same basic logic as with the case of a single random variable, we can define a second order approximation for ( )in terms of and express ′ (0) and ′′(0) in terms of partial derivatives of the indirect utility function, as given in (18a) and (18b).
Once again using the expression • + = − 2 we can re-write (18b) as (18c).
(18 )
Now substituting these terms into the second order approximation for the option price function with the derivatives of the function evaluated at t=0 (comparable to what we did with the certainty equivalent) we have (19).
The last term in equation (19) has a comparable form to that in equation ( As we demonstrate in the Appendix, the adjustment for uncertainty would not change had we adopted a compensating surplus (or a willingness to pay) framework to define the option price (labeled as W). The final result in this case is given in equation (21).
The virtual price flexibility, , can be related to the income elasticity of demand for environmental services relative to a composite elasticity of substitution between these services and a Hicksian composite good for all private goods that each individual consumes 14 .
While we might expect that the income elasticity of demand for environmental services is greater than unity, there is also some indirect evidence indicating for some resources it may be less than one (see Kristrm and Riera [1996] ).
The logic underlying the expectation for values greater that one assumes that higher demands are associated with individuals with higher incomes. If we assume the income elasticity is unity, this adaptation of Chavas' logic would imply that we consider whether private goods provide adequate substitutes for the environmental services that are likely to be subject to policy uncertainty. If they do not have good substitutes, then we would expect the price flexibility (in absolute magnitude) to be appreciably greater than one. So a range of Our compensation index for the importance of uncertainty needs one more parametereither the "price" flexibility of income ( ), using equation (14) or the income elasticity of demand for a private good ( ) known to be a weak complement to the non-market service, using equation (15). There are estimates of both in the literature (see Phaneuf and Smith [2005] for the case of recreation). None of these estimates for either or would exceed the upper limit from Chetty's range for r and certainly not for the majority of the other literature using either or . Thus, we would expect that and the relative variance in q are the primary factors influencing the size of ( � 0 � ).
Developing a range of empirical examples for the approximate magnitude of ( � 0 � ) is difficult because we are usually confined to proxy variables as our measures for q and empirical studies do not always present measures for the variability in these proxies over time or geography. Fortunately, Currie and Neidell's [2005] results using weekly ozone and PM10 (particulate matter 10 microns or less) readings at the zip code level in California for 11 years 15 Virtual income is the sum of monetary income plus the virtual expenditures (i.e. virtual price of the quasi fixed service times the amount of the service with the baseline or reference allocation of resources). Carbone and Smith [2008] provide a sensitivity analysis of the effects of the assumption about this virtual share for partial and general equilibrium measures of the excess burden of taxes that would affect nonmarket environmental services. 16 See Meyer and Meyer's [2005] summary reports adjusted estimates between 0.8 and 2.4 for wealth and 2.8 to 7 for consumption which is likely more relevant for our income measure. See their Table 2 . 17 See Cohen and Einav [2007 ] .
provide what we need 18 . Considering first the results for ozone, our approximate estimates of the remaining parameters would imply that a "back of the envelope" estimate of the welfare importance of the uncertainty in ozone of about two percent. Comparing this estimate with an estimate of ̂ for the change in ozone from 1989 to 2000 relative to 1 .This example interprets the change in ozone from 1989 to 2000 as ( � 1 − 0 ). Our ratio would be .227. So uncertainty would call for reducing conventional benefit measures compared to 1 by ten percent. The same exercise for PM10 would imply about a twelve percent reduction to the corresponding ̂ compared to the equivalent 1 . Of course, the importance of our index of uncertainty will vary with the measure for q and the context. As we discuss in footnote #13 above, our measure of the aversion to uncertainty in environmental conditions will also depend on whether other goods can be adjusted. The comparison we discuss in that note provides a direct example of the potential importance of private (and public) adaptation to environmental uncertainty. It illustrates why the ability to adapt with private goods affects the adjustment for uncertainty. Our sample calculations would change with different assumptions about the extent of adaptation. When adjustment is not possible or very costly, uncertainty in the outcomes of environmental policy can be important to the benefits we attribute to proposed policies.
Implications
Benefit cost analyses of proposed environmental policies assume the regulations being evaluated "work". That is, they assume the new rules yield, with certainty, the improvements in the specific dimensions of environmental quality that are being assessed. As we noted earlier, there are many examples of discrepancies between the anticipated outcomes of regulatory programs and what is actually realized. This observation is hardly surprising.
Indeed, analysts use these experiences to enhance our understanding of the rulemaking process.
People adapt to uncertainty in environmental conditions. We selected one example for the case of air quality. There are many other empirical examples where individuals recognize uncertainty in environmental conditions and adjust their behavior -whether in response to warnings about food products or drinking water, weather and outdoor recreation, or indoor air pollution 19 . The possibility that policy measure may change this uncertainty -increasing the variability in environmental conditions or decreasing it has been overlooked in the literature.
Once we acknowledge people adapt then the benefit measures we attribute to these policies need to reflect this uncertainty.
Of course, each regulatory program will be different. Realized outcomes from the new rules depend on the actual conditions of those facilities responsible for the emissions. They also depend on the implementation process and the natural systems that affect the dispersal of emissions and the resulting ambient air quality. To the extent one policy leads to recognizable differences in the uncertainty likely for environmental services provided by that program, the benefit estimates should be reduced to reflect it. Our index of compensation for risk provides a first step in acknowledging that people recognize uncertainty in environmental quality.
These responses imply that when benefits are attributed to new policies they should be reduced to take account of the uncertainty in what they can actually deliver.
Our examples were presented in relative terms (i.e. compared to approximate measures for 1 ) deliberately because each component of the example uses proxy measures for quality and realistic examples will require careful delineation of the estimates underlying for each environmental resource and a closer link to the specific policies under consideration.
Ideally the development of the index will motivate greater effort to consider how the variance in environmental quality should be measured --whether over locations within the same air shed (or river basin) or over time for a given location --as well as the economic parameters that are components of .
